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The most diverse countries and regions of the planet have long faced 
the challenge of preventing and overcoming real or imminent situations that 
may in some way disrupt the security of their energy infrastructure, requir-
ing ostensive and effective military intervention in the surveillance, control 
and defense of such environments. The cases are the most varied, including 
prevention and response to criminal actions against oil and gas wells and 
platforms, attacks on hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, refineries, wind 
and solar farms, transport ships, ports, tanks, oil and gas pipelines, among 
others, whether located in the continental or oceanic region. Problems widen 
and require different types of responses as cyber attacks on electronic infor-
mation and monitoring systems, as well as the occurrence of natural events 
of catastrophic dimensions, are observed.
The onslaught of any internal or external agent against the critical 
or strategically valuable energy infrastructure of a State can cause the inter-
ruption or collapse of the supply of one of the most essential inputs to the 
maintenance of a country’s survival and development conditions and of its 
society in general. And, among the many actions necessary to protect the en-
ergy production, commercialization and consumption chain, it is imperative 
to adequately organize the defense of such a complex through the actions of 
the armed forces (Navy, Army and Aeronautics), given the specific nature of 
certain threats. Since the critical energy infrastructure represents a capital 
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element for a country, it is expected that the issue occupies a prominent place 
in the construction of its defense strategy.
Considering the context described above, this text presents an analysis 
on how the protection of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure is addressed 
within the scope of the national defense policy, seeking to better understand 
how the security of energy supply in Brazil is outlined. The analysis devel-
oped in this text is concerned with answering three basic questions: 1- Which 
are and where are located the main Brazilian critical energy infrastructures 
referring to the chain of oil, by-products and natural gas? 2- To which extent 
is the protection of these infrastructures provided for in the national defense 
policy, in particular, in the main documents dealing with the matter? 3- How 
is the planning of employment of Brazilian military power in the prevention 
and response to threats or attacks against the infrastructure related to the 
aforementioned sources?
In examining the national literature, it seems that there is not an ad-
equate attention to this issue in the studies dedicated to energy security in 
Brazil, at least regarding a more specific and detailed approach to what is 
determined by the national defense policy on the protection of Brazilian crit-
ical energy infrastructure, except for a few rare exceptions (Demeterco 2014; 
Vicente 2014). In general, the issue is dealt with marginally in the context of 
issues related to security and national defense challenges (Silva and Costa 
2009; Hage 2008), and to the consequences of possible conflicts in the face 
of instabilities in the regional contours (Nasser and Moraes 2014; Acioly and 
Moraes 2011), to the increase in transnational illicit activities (Reis 2011), to 
the disputes over the demarcation of maritime zones and sovereignty over 
natural resources (Silva 2013; Martins 2010), to the necessity of protection of 
oil and gas reserves in the pre-salt layer (Oliveira, Cepik, Brites 2013; Metri 
2009), as well as to the possibility of confrontations resulting from the inter-
ference of extra-regional powers in the Atlantic and South America (Vidigal 
2014; Thuswohl 2008).
The analysis of critical infrastructure protection developed in this arti-
cle is embedded in issues related to the military dimension of energy security, 
which generally comprehends a discussion of the need to defend, through 
military action, both reserves and national structural energy complexes 
against threats that may affect its perfect functioning and maintenance of the 
livelihood and progress of society and the country as a whole. The approach 
from a militaristic or defense-related perspective will be based on scenarios 
and analysis that involve the use of force or of the other military devices relat-
ed to energy disputes, criminal acts, military conflicts, operational incidents, 




The reflective and discursive universe of studies in the case of the 
military dimension of energy security tends to be centered on issues such as 
the identification of domestic or transnational threats of physical or virtual 
attacks resulting from the action of state or non-state actors against energy 
reserves or infrastructure. Similarly, it involves analyzing the offensive and 
defensive capabilities of a particular country, a regional security complex or 
the international community, against events that may cause instability to the 
energy supply or the lucrative flow of such resources to the consumer market. 
The major purpose of this reflection is related in general to the maintenance 
of the necessary conditions for the continuous and adequate energy supply 
at the national, regional and international level, depending on the sphere of 
analysis.
However, it is worth mentioning that studies and practices on the 
protection of critical energy infrastructure are much broader, since engineer-
ing systems, for example, suffer occasional equipment failures and require 
periodic maintenance, which implies measures that involve both private and 
public sectors, depending on the case (see Aradau 2010, Farrel et al. 2004). 
Similarly, energy security can have different dimensions ranging from polit-
ical and military to technical and economic ones, noting, for example, that 
economists are mainly concerned with the macroeconomic impacts emanat-
ing from rising energy prices and the dangers of economic losses due to pos-
sible supply failures (see Ciută 2010; Bielecki 2002).
This paper seeks, therefore, to contribute, in some way, to the over-
coming of a gap in the national literature, proposing a specific, systematic 
and in depth study on a specific aspect of the protection of the Brazilian crit-
ical energy infrastructure. In order to comply with this intent and answer 
the aforementioned questions, in addition to this introduction, the paper has 
four more parts. In the next section, the main objective is to present some 
conceptual frameworks on the subject, in addition to identifying which are 
and where are the main infrastructures of production, commercialization and 
consumption of energy in Brazil, especially those related to the chain of oil, 
by-products and natural gas, with the objective of obtaining a concrete refer-
ence point for the analysis of vulnerabilities and the answers necessary for its 
defense.
In the following section, the main scope is to verify how the security 
of energy infrastructure is effectively incorporated and treated as a military 
dimension in Brazil, in particular, to analyze how it conforms to the two main 
defense policy documents in the country: the National Defense Policy and 
the National Defense Strategy. The fourth section focuses on the evaluation 
National defense policy and the protection of the critical energy infrastructure in Brazi
176 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 
of aspects related to the planning of Brazil’s military offensive and defensive 
capability, aiming at protecting the infrastructure related to the sources men-
tioned above, in the midst of the main (external) threats perceived by the Bra-
zilian government and by scholars. Finally, final considerations are presented 
with some conclusions in order to systematize the results obtained from the 
reflections carried out throughout the text.
Critical infrastructure and energy security in Brazil: oil, gas 
and by-products
The concept of critical infrastructure in Brazil is precisely defined by 
Article 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Pres-
idency of the Republic (GSI / PR), of February 8 2008, which “Establishes 
Technical Groups for Security of Critical Infrastructures (GTSIC) and oth-
er measures”. According to this ordinance “IEC [Critical Infrastructures] are 
considered as installations, services and goods that, if disrupted or destroyed, 
will have serious social, economic, political, international or national security 
impact.” The Article 3 of the above-mentioned document lists, between items 
I and V, the priority areas of critical infrastructure, without prejudice to others 
that may be defined, with an energy-related infrastructure being nominally 
included. The others refer to the transport network, water, telecommunica-
tions and finance.
The aforementioned GSI / PR Ordinance, and no other official feder-
al government document, currently establishes a precise definition of critical 
energy infrastructure in the country. In contrast to Brazil, Canada, for exam-
ple, has the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, which, among other 
aspects, defines precisely the meaning of the term:
Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, facilities, technolo-
gies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security 
or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of gov-
ernment. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected and 
interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national bor-
ders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss 
of life, adverse economic effects, and significant harm to public confidence 
(Canada 2009).
Based on the aforementioned definition, it can be said that the critical 
or strategically valuable energy infrastructure refers to the chain of extraction, 
production, processing, transportation, commercialization and consumption 
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of energy of fundamental importance to the survival and development of the 
country and its people in general, whose disruption or destruction can still 
have repercussions in the international sphere (Paiva 2015, 151). However, it 
should be emphasized that it is not any hydroelectric plant, pipeline, storage 
or logistics structure that has strategic value, but those that actually have the 
potential to cause the impacts previously mentioned and have a national or 
international repercussion (Demeterco 2014, 07).
With regard to the critical energy infrastructure in Brazil that involves 
oil, natural gas and by-products, it can be affirmed that much of it is located in 
or near the maritime area. In this sense, the essential structures mentioned 
initially include those located in the midst of Atlantic waters, and are related 
to hydrocarbon extraction, exploitation and storage bases, peculiar physical 
environments such as maritime transportation routes of energy resources, 
and watercraft, pipelines and other means of flow of fossil products extracted 
from the sea. On the other hand, there is also the infrastructure located in the 
coastal zone, which is related to the generation, processing, storage, transfer 
and transportation of energy resources. In this case, the following structural 
energy complexes are present in or close to the coastal zone: the centers of 
refining and storage of petroleum and production of derivatives; natural gas 
processing units; and the circulation pipelines of petroleum, by-products, nat-
ural gas, ethanol, solvents and others.
One of the starting points for understanding the relationship between 
critical energy infrastructure and the Brazilian Atlantic territorial extension 
lies in the fact that most of the proven reserves of oil and natural gas located in 
Brazil are found in the South Atlantic, respectively about 94.9% and 88.2% of 
the national deposits of these sources are in marine soil (ANP 2015, 70-73)2. 
Regarding oil production, official data reveals the same preponderant role of 
the South Atlantic, with 92.5% of this resource being produced from the sea 
(ANP 2015, 75). Gas production in offshore fields does not reach the same 
numbers when compared to oil, but they are no less prominent, since 73.3% 
of the country’s gas originates from the ocean (ANP 2015, 82).
In the midst of this reality, it is worth noting that, according to data 
provided by the Brazilian Navy’s Directorate of Ports and Coasts (Brasil 2016), 
in order to meet the economic exploitation of hydrocarbons derived from the 
2  ANP Ordinance No. 9, dated 01/21/2000, defines proven reserves in the following terms: 
"Reserves of oil and natural gas which, based on the analysis of geological and engineering 
data, are estimated to recover commercially from uncovered and evaluated reservoirs, with 
high degree of certainty, and whose estimate considers the current economic conditions, the 
usually viable operational methods and the regulations established by Brazilian petroleum and 
tax legislation."
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sea, there are 237 structural energy complexes in Brazilian waters, of which 
177 were in operation and 60 were deactivated. This infrastructure refers to 
fixed, self-lifting and multi-legged platforms, drillships and probes and pro-
duction, storage and transfer floating systems. As can be seen, from the car-
togram below, most of them are found in the basins present along the Brazil-
ian coast, given their predominance in such region.
Cartogram 1 - Effective basins in the areas of the Union and with the produc-
tive units in areas contracted with discovered and undiscovered conventional 
resources
most of them are found in the basins present along the Brazilian coast, given their 
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Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy and Energy Research Company (MME, EPE 
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In addition to the infrastructural complexes linked to the oil and natural gas reserves in 
Brazil located in the oceanic region, there is also the infrastructure located in the coastal zone, 
which is related to the generation, processing, storage, transfer and transportation of energy 
resources. In this case, the following structural energy complexes can be highlighted: the 
centers of petroleum refining and production of derivatives; natural gas processing units; and 
the circulation pipelines of petroleum, by-products, natural gas, ethanol, solvents and others. 
When verifying the geographic location of the 17 national industrial complexes 
responsible for the petroleum refining and the production of petroleum products in Brazil, it is 
verified that the majority is located in the Brazilian coastal zone or in cities that are very close 
to the sea3. In addition to performing the refining process, such complexes are also 
responsible for the storage of most of the oil, petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, 
Kerosene aviation), intermediate products (turpentine and diesel) and ethanol that supply the 
country, whether originating from domestic production or from the external market. Similarly, 
when analyzing the location of the 15 national production centers that account for the 
                                               
3 The refineries are located in the states of Amazonas (Reman), Ceará (Lubnor), Rio Grande do Norte (RPCC), 
Pernambuco (Rnest), Bahia (RLAM and Dax Oil), Rio de Janeiro (Manguinhos, Reduc), São Paulo (Recap, 
Replan, Revap, RPBC and Univen), Minas Gerais (Regap), Paraná (Repar) and Rio Grande do Sul 
(Riograndense and Refap). 
Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy and Energy Research Company (MME, EPE 2015a, 
241)
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Brazilian coastal zone or in cities that are very close to the sea3. In addition 
to performing the refining process, such complexes are also responsible for 
the storage of most of the oil, petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, fuel oil, 
Kerosene aviation), intermediate products (turpentine and diesel) and etha-
nol that supply the country, whether originating from domestic production 
or from the external market. Similarly, when analyzing the location of the 15 
national production centers that account for the processing of natural gas in 
Brazil, it is found that they are also located predominantly in the Brazilian 
coastal zone4.
The cartogram below shows perfectly how close to the Brazilian coast 
the petroleum refineries and the centers of production and processing of nat-
ural gas, industrial complexes of great relevance for national energy security 
are.
Cartogram 2 - Refining and Processing Units - 2014
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Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 105) 
  
The movement of petroleum, by-products and ethanol in Brazil is also closely related 
to the Atlantic Ocean, since most of the storage terminals and pipelines carrying such 
resources are located near the Brazilian coast. The terminals are a set of properly equipped 
facilities for receiving, shipping and storing petroleum products and other fuels, which can be 
classified as maritime, fluvial, lacustrine and terrestrial5. The country has a total of 1,939 
tanks, distributed in 108 authorized terminals, including 9 ethanol collection centers (21 
tanks), 56 waterways terminals (1,442 tanks) and 43 terrestrial terminals (476 tanks). The 
waterway terminals concentrate most of the nominal storage capacity (69.6%) and the largest 
number of authorized tanks (74.4%) (ANP 2015,  113). Although there is a diversity of water 
and land terminals in Brazil, it can be seen from the map below that most are located in the 
Brazilian coastal zone. 
  
                                               
4 The processing centers are located in the states of Amazonas (Polo Urucu), Ceará (Polo Lubnor), Rio Grande 
do Norte (Polo Guamaré), Alagoas (Polo Alagoas), Sergipe (Polo Atalaia), Bahia (Polos Candeias, Pojuca and 
São (Polos Cacimbas and Sul Capixaba), Rio de Janeiro (Polos Reduc and Cabiúnas), São Paulo (Polos RPBC 
and Caraguatatuba) and Paraná (Araucária). 
5 The definition was based on the one proposed on the website of the National Petroleum Agency at: 
<http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=582#t>. Accessed: May 22, 2014. 
Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 105)
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and pipelines carrying such resources are located near the Brazilian coast. 
The terminals are a set of properly equipped facilities for receiving, shipping 
and storing petroleum products and other fuels, which can be classified as 
maritime, fluvial, lacustrine and terrestrial5. The country has a total of 1,939 
tanks, distributed in 108 authorized terminals, including 9 ethanol collection 
centers (21 tanks), 56 waterways terminals (1,442 tanks) and 43 terrestrial ter-
minals (476 tanks). The waterway terminals concentrate most of the nominal 
storage capacity (69.6%) and the largest number of authorized tanks (74.4%) 
(ANP 2015,  113). Although there is a diversity of water and land terminals in 
Brazil, it can be seen from the map below that most are located in the Brazil-
ian coastal zone.
Cartogram 3 - Petroleum and Derivatives Production and Movement Infrastruc-
ture - 2014
Cartogram 3 - Petroleum and Derivatives Production and 
Movement Infrastructure - 2014 
 
Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015,  117) 
 
Regarding the infrastructure related to the movement of energy resources, it is 
important to highlight that there is a whole fleet of ships that cross the sea lanes. Cabotage 
navigation, for instance between ports and terminals within Brazil, is responsible for much of 
the transportation of oil and gas from offshore platforms to refineries, fuel distribution 
between coastal terminals, etc. (ANTAQ 2014). According to data from the National Agency 
for Waterway Transportation, among the groups of merchandise transported in national 
cabotage in the first half of 2014, the movement of "Fuels, Mineral Oils and Products" stands 
out prominently, accounting on average for 76.5% of the tonnage handled in that period 
between Brazilian ports (ANTAQ 2014, 4). 
The infrastructure related to energy movement i  Brazil also i cludes pipelines, which 
contribute to the circulation of oil, by-products, natural gas and other products such as ethanol 
and solvents. By 2014, the country had 601 pipelines that stretched for 19.7 thousand 
kilometers. The most extensive part of the pipeline network is used in the movement of 
natural gas (gas pipelines), whose extension is 11.7 thousand km, using 110 ducts. These 
structures available for the circulation of oil and by-products (oil pipelines) total 422 
installations that extend for 7.9 thousand km. The rest of the network (37 ducts - 76 km) is 
used to move other products, such as ethanol and solvents (ANP 2015, 116). 
The cartogram previously shown (circulation of oil and derivatives) and the following 
(natural gas movement) show that a considerable part of these pipelines related to the energy 
infrastructure is close to the Brazilian coastal zone, once again revealing the importance of the 
country's maritime space because of the need to ensure national energy security. 
  
Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015,  117)
Regarding the infrastructure related to the movement of energy re-
sources, it is important to highlight that there is a whole fleet of ships that 
cross the sea lanes. Cabotage navigation, for instance between ports and ter-
minals within Brazil, is responsible for much of the transportation of oil and 
gas from offshore platforms to refineries, fuel distribution between coastal 
terminals, etc. (ANTAQ 2014). According to data from the National Agency 
5  The definition was based on the one proposed on the website of the National Petroleum 
Agency at: <http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=582#t>. Accessed: May 22, 2014.
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for Waterway Transportation, among the groups of merchandise transported 
in national cabotage in the first half of 2014, the movement of “Fuels, Mineral 
Oils and Products” stands out prominently, accounting on average for 76.5% 
of the tonnage handled in that period between Brazilian ports (ANTAQ 2014, 
4).
The infrastructure related to energy movement in Brazil also includes 
pipelines, which contribute to the circulation of oil, by-products, natural gas 
and other products such as ethanol and solvents. By 2014, the country had 
601 pipelines that stretched for 19.7 thousand kilometers. The most exten-
sive part of the pipeline network is used in the movement of natural gas (gas 
pipelines), whose extension is 11.7 thousand km, using 110 ducts. These struc-
tures available for the circulation of oil and by-products (oil pipelines) total 
422 installations that extend for 7.9 thousand km. The rest of the network (37 
ducts - 76 km) is used to move other products, such as ethanol and solvents 
(ANP 2015, 116).
The cartogram previously shown (circulation of oil and derivatives) 
and the following (natural gas movement) show that a considerable part of 
these pipelines related to the energy infrastructure is close to the Brazilian 
coastal zone, once again revealing the importance of the country’s maritime 
space because of the need to ensure national energy security.
Cartogram 4 - Natural Gas Production and Movement Infrastructure - 2014
Cartogram 4 - Natural Gas Production and Movement Infrastructure - 2014 
 
Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 118). 
 
The South Atlantic is equally important for Brazil as it represents the main route of 
entry and exit of various energy resources to the country. The importance of these maritime 
routes in the export and import of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas to Brazil is 
indisputable, especially when analyzing official data indicating where these resources 
circulate to reach the country. According to information available in the "AliceWeb" system 
of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), in the period from 2005 
to 2015, practically all exports and imports of oil and by-products from Brazil - 99.9% - 
occurred through the Atlantic sea lanes6. 
From the data provided by the MDIC, also in the "AliceWeb" system, between 2005 
and 2015, Brazilian natural gas exports are also mainly made through maritime transport7. 
Although the volume transported through oceanic routes is not equivalent to that of the export 
of oil and by-products, its relevance for the commercialization of Brazilian natural gas abroad 
is undeniable, as can be stated from the data table below. 
In regard to the importation of natural gas, it is verified that the importance of 
maritime transport loses space. The main reason is the role of Bolivian gas in meeting the 
national demand, which occurs through terrestrial gas pipeline. However, it should be noted 
that between 2005 and 2015, the participation of the maritime route in the importation of 
natural gas has been increasing, mainly due to the increase in the acquisition of natural gas in 
the foreign market, in order to meet the growing demand of the Brazilian market. 
 
1 - EXPORT AND IMPORTS OF NATURAL GAS IN BRAZIL BY MARITIME 
                                               
6 The search in the "AliceWeb" system was done with the code "2709" for oil and "2710" for derivatives of the 
Mercosur Common Nomenclature. 
7 The search in the "AliceWeb" system was done with the code "2711" of the Mercosur Common Nomenclature. 
Source: National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP 2015, 118).
The South Atlantic is equally important for Brazil as it represents the 
National defense policy and the protection of the critical energy infrastructure in Brazi
182 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 
main route of entry and exit of various energy resources to the country. The 
importance of these maritime routes in the export and import of petroleum, 
petroleum products and natural gas to Brazil is indisputable, especially when 
analyzing official data indicating where these resources circulate to reach the 
country. According to information available in the “AliceWeb” system of the 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), in the period 
from 2005 to 2015, practically all exports and imports of oil and by-products 
from Brazil - 99.9% - occurred through the Atlantic sea lanes6.
From the data provided by the MDIC, also in the “AliceWeb” system, 
between 2005 and 2015, Brazilian natural gas exports are also mainly made 
through maritime transport7. Although the volume transported through oce-
anic routes is not equivalent to that of the export of oil and by-products, its 
relevance for the commercialization of Brazilian natural gas abroad is unde-
niable, as can be stated from the data table below.
In regard to the importation of natural gas, it is verified that the im-
portance of maritime transport loses space. The main reason is the role of 
Bolivian gas in meeting the national demand, which occurs through terrestri-
al gas pipeline. However, it should be noted that between 2005 and 2015, the 
participation of the maritime route in the importation of natural gas has been 
increasing, mainly due to the increase in the acquisition of natural gas in the 
foreign market, in order to meet the growing demand of the Brazilian market.
Table 1 - Exports and imports of natural gas in Brazil by maritime route
EXPORTS




100,2 25,1 34,8 4,1 11,1 4,1 60,3 247,1 78,4 75,1 1,3
Maritime 
Route (%) 100 100 98,7 84,6 99,8 60,5 97,5 99,92 100 99,9 99,75
IMPORTS




1.061 1.756 2.107 3.714 2.359 4.037 4.529 5.959 7.997 15.286 16.856
Maritime 
Route (%) 7,2 10,48 11,34 12,43 21,53 34,44 24,35 33,47 39,30 40,57 44,64
Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (“AliceWeb” system)
6  The search in the "AliceWeb" system was done with the code "2709" for oil and "2710" for 
derivatives of the Mercosur Common Nomenclature.




On the one hand, the dependence of the Brazilian market on imports 
of oil, by-products and natural gas requires the government attention to en-
sure that the roads through which these products arrive in the country are 
protected, so as to guarantee the domestic supply and indispensable means 
for national development. On the other hand, considering that the exports of 
such resources are an important source of dividends for the Brazilian econ-
omy, with a considerable rising trend for the next years (due to the pre-salt 
discoveries), it is a matter of safeguarding the necessary conditions for the 
appropriate use of opportunities for generating wealth for the country.
The next section will find out in which the extent the protection of 
this whole infrastructure is present in the main documents that deal with the 
national defense policy.
Protection of the Brazilian energy infrastructure of oil, gas 
and by-products in the national defense policy
Concerning the military protection of critical or strategically valuable 
energy infrastructure in Brazil, there is currently no legislation and official 
documents within the scope of the Brazilian federal government that deal ex-
clusively with the issue in the sphere of national defense. On the other hand, 
the telecommunications sector already has a considerable political, institu-
tional and conceptual framework, consolidated in official documents, among 
which we can highlight the “Basic guidelines to the manager of information 
and communication security: version 2.0” (Brasil 2016), the “Strategy of in-
formation and communications security and of cyber security of the federal 
public administration for 2015-2018: version 1.0” (Brasil 2015), the “Green 
paper: cyber security in Brazil” (Brasil 2010a), and the “Reference guide to the 
security of critical information infrastructures” (Brasil 2010b).
However, this does not mean that the main instruments of nation-
al defense policy guidance do not take into account the need to ensure the 
protection of the infrastructure of recognized strategic value for the country, 
including that related to energy. In this sense, one can highlight the predic-
tions found in the National Defense Policy and in the National Defense Strat-
egy. The former stands out as the highest-level document in national defense 
planning, establishing objectives and guidelines for the preparation and use 
of national military capacity. The other relates to the organization and orien-
tation of the Armed Forces to better carry out their constitutional destiny and 
their attributions in peace and war.
The National Defense Policy refers to the “infrastructure of strategic 
National defense policy and the protection of the critical energy infrastructure in Brazi
184 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.10, Jul./Dec. 2016 
value” only twice, but does not use the term or bring specific directions in 
the sense proposed in the analysis presented in this text. Initially, the NDP 
uses the expression when it addresses “The regional environment and the 
strategic contour”, highlighting the benefits of initiatives to promote infra-
structure improvement in the South American region: “The expansion and 
modernization of South America’s infrastructure can make the connection 
between its productive centers and the two oceans, facilitating development 
and integration” (Brasil 2005). The second mention occurs in the section that 
addresses the policies and actions that can contribute to the achievement of 
National Defense objectives, in expressing the need to “strengthen the in-
frastructure of strategic value for National Defense, primarily transportation, 
energy and communications” (Brasil 2005). The energy infrastructure, in this 
case, is considered much more as a means to promote national defense, and 
not properly an end to be achieved by the Brazilian military.
However, this does not mean that the NDP does not take into account 
the need to guarantee protection to the energy infrastructure of recognized 
strategic value for the country, especially that present in the waters or in the 
coastal area of the South Atlantic. However, such a forecast is made indirectly, 
as it can be observed through the extensive interpretation of other passages 
of its text.
The military defense of the Brazilian energy infrastructure would be 
safeguarded by the NDP - in the terms of the present study -, by establishing 
as a guideline that the planning of the national defense should include, as 
a priority, the areas where the greatest concentration of political, economic 
power and abundance of resources are found. In this sense, it specifically 
mentions coastal regions and Brazilian jurisdictional waters in the South At-
lantic (Brasil 2005). In this case the NDP precisely points out that in this area 
are the largest national oil and gas reserves, as well as the main route through 
which almost all Brazilian foreign trade passes (Brasil 2005). In addition, it 
should be pointed out that this document emphatically indicates that there is 
a possibility in this century that disputes over energy sources and other scarce 
natural resources will intensify, which may become an object of international 
interest and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, leading to 
possible conflict scenarios (Brasil 2005).
In such circumstances, it is not sensible to say that the Brazilian 
Armed Forces are supposed to protect only the energy resources and the 
transportation routes of these goods, and ignore the defense of the related 
infrastructure, since in a case of conflict both would be, inseparably, menaced 
by conflicting agents. Possible disputes relating to the global scarcity of re-
sources and the domain over specific natural assets, including energy, would 
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thus constitute an equal threat to the security of national energy-related infra-
structure, given the inseparability of the issues in the promotion of security 
and national defense. As an essential element for the country’s development, 
the Brazilian government could not disregard this factor as a central element 
in shaping the national defense policy, aiming to protect, among others, Bra-
zilian energy interests in the South Atlantic region.
Considering the previous discussion, in the context of the National 
Defense Policy, the safeguarding of the Brazilian critical energy infrastructure 
in the Atlantic through national military power is based mainly on a debate 
regarding the protection of strategic resources and the domain of vital spaces 
over which the country must guarantee the exercise of sovereign rights. In 
this sense, it also reveals, in an objective way, the perception that energy is one 
of the central determinants of power and wealth in international relations, 
and may be the target of foreign greed. Because of this, in this intricate board, 
it is of capital importance for Brazil, and for any country in general, not only 
the defense of the energy sources themselves, of the area where they are and 
of the routes through which such resources circulate, but also the protection 
of any related infrastructure complex, without which it is not possible to oper-
ate all that chain, which allows to exploit energy economically.
The National Defense Strategy (2008), on the other hand, is much 
more objective and emphatic about the need to protect the infrastructure of 
relevant strategic value for Brazil, among which the ones related to energy 
stand out. First, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphatically confirms 
that the Brazilian government should have as one of its focuses the proactive 
defense of the oil platforms located in its jurisdictional waters (Brasil 2008), 
which, as previously mentioned, are responsible for most of the oil and natu-
ral gas production in the country. In addition, it also establishes as a priority 
the proactive defense of Brazilian naval and port facilities (Brasil 2008), pre-
cisely where a large part of the country’s national infrastructure for storage, 
transportation and transfer of energy resources is located. In the same sense, 
it also emphasizes the need to be “[...] ready to respond to any threat, by State 
or by non-conventional or criminal forces, to maritime trade routes” (Brasil 
2008), which consist in the main routes for circulation of energy resources 
in Brazil.
In general terms, the NDS also addresses the protection of critical in-
frastructure, including energy infrastructure, by planning the spatial distribu-
tion of military installations and the quantification of the means necessary to 
effectively address the national Armed Forces’ Employment Hypotheses. The 
determination, in this case, is categorical in the sense that “[...] the National 
Defense System has the means to improve surveillance; to control airspace, 
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land borders, territory and Brazilian jurisdictional waters; and the national 
strategic infrastructure” (Brasil 2008, emphasis added). The insertion of this 
orientation in the field of the “employment hypotheses” of Brazilian military 
power is especially important since, given the indeterminacy and unpredicta-
bility of the latent threats to the country, strategic infrastructure is chosen as 
a priority object in national defense planning.
In another passage, the protection of energy infrastructure of vital im-
portance to Brazil is once again recognized by the NDS, in this case, for repre-
senting a determining factor for national development. In this sense, it deter-
mines that the Ministry of Defense, in planning the spatial distribution of the 
Armed Forces in the national territory, prioritizes, among other things, “the 
maintenance of troops in the center-south of the Country to guarantee the 
defense of the main demographic, industrial and economic concentration, as 
well as that of infrastructure, particularly the energy generator” (Brasil 2008, 
emphasis added). The directing of the troops in this continental region of the 
country ends up focusing exactly where much of the energy infrastructure 
that is connected to the South Atlantic - as demonstrated in the previous sec-
tion - is found, whether in the ocean waters or in the Brazilian coastal zone.
The National Defense Strategy then states that the increase in the 
level of National Security should emphasize “[...] measures for the security 
of critical infrastructure areas, including services, in particular with regard 
to energy, transport, water and telecommunications “(Brasil 2008, emphasis 
added). As stated in the NDS, the increase in the level of National Security 
will be incumbent upon all instances of the State. However, in the case of the 
aforementioned structural complexes, the responsibility lies with the “Minis-
tries of Defense, Mines and Energy, Transport, National Integration and Com-
munications and the coordination, evaluation, monitoring and risk reduction 
duties carried out by the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of 
the Republic (GSI / PR)” (Brasil 2008). By virtue of this determination, it is 
understood why the definition of the concept of critical infrastructure fell pre-
cisely to the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic, 
as previously cited.
The establishment of this safety net undoubtedly has as one of its 
focus the concern with the maintenance of national energy security, given its 
strategic condition. In this context, both the National Defense Policy and the 
National Defense Strategy guide the Brazilian government to be diligently 
prepared and have the means to respond appropriately to threats from inter-
nal and external agents that may inflict some sort of constraint on its energy 
interests.
The following section will verify how the planning of force employ-
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ment of the Brazilian military power takes place regarding the prevention and 
response to threats or attacks against the infrastructure related to the oil, gas 
and by-products chain mentioned above.
Strategies of Brazilian military action in the defense of the 
national energy infrastructure of oil, gas and by-products
The National Defense Strategy outlines in a specific way how actions 
should be developed in order to exercise surveillance and defense of jurisdic-
tional waters and the Brazilian coastal zone, which will directly and indirectly 
affect the protection of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure. In this sense, it 
establishes primarily that the main role in the defense of this space will be in 
charge of the Brazilian Navy, developing its actions towards three objectives: 
denial of the use of the sea, control of maritime areas and the projection of 
power (Brasil 2008).
The way in which the Brazilian Navy will implement these objectives, 
according to the aforementioned document, will be unequal and joint, in or-
der to respond effectively to the challenges presented (Brasil 2008). Accord-
ing to the NDS, the priority will be to guarantee the means to deny the use 
of waters under Brazilian rule, in order to counteract any concentration of 
enemy forces that may approach Brazil by sea (Brasil 2008). The denial of the 
use of the sea to the invader is therefore considered the reference point for the 
organization of Brazil’s maritime defense strategy.
The denial of the use of the sea to the enemy is defined by the Bra-
zilian Navy in the following terms: “Basic task of Naval Power that consists 
of hampering the establishment of control of maritime area by the enemy, or 
the exploitation of this control through the destruction or neutralization of its 
naval forces, the attack on its maritime communication lines and points of 
support” (Brasil 2007,  168). The main purpose of this measure is, above all, 
to prevent enemy forces from advancing or remaining freely in Brazilian wa-
ters, land and airspace. The main action in these cases is to impose different 
obstacles on the invaders, thus preventing them from investing in any way 
against the country.
There are a variety of situations that may require denial of the use of 
the sea by the Brazilian Navy because it has a negative impact on the security 
of Brazilian critical energy infrastructure in the South Atlantic. Current liter-
ature from both civil and military academic circles usually mentions at least 
four types of threats (see Paiva 2015,  159-194). The first threat is the neo-tra-
ditionalist, which in reality are ‘old threats’ that stem from unlawful actions 
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such as piracy, terrorism and illegal trafficking (Reis 2011). The reports from 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), for exam-
ple, accurately point to the South Atlantic, especially Brazil, as an important 
route for crimes relating to illegal transnational flows involving money, drugs, 
arms and people. During the Navy’s Blue Amazon operation, held in Febru-
ary 2014, part of the training was the retake of an oil platform, considering 
that a terrorist group was aiming to control this infrastructural complex (see 
Mathias 2014).
The second is the instability of the countries bordering the South At-
lantic, as internal political, economic and social vicissitudes may transcend 
borders and become a threat to Brazil’s energy security. One focus of Brazil-
ian concerns is the Gulf of Guinea, on the west coast of Africa, a region close 
to areas where a considerable part of Brazil’s oil and natural gas production is 
located. This may jeopardize Brazilian energy production, the flow of energy 
resources in the maritime routes that cross the region, as well as all related 
critical infrastructure (Amroim 2013; Fiori, Padula, Vater 2012; Fonseca 2011).
The third threat refers to the plea against Brazilian sovereignty over 
its jurisdictional waters in the South Atlantic, which may address Brazil’s ex-
clusive possession over the areas where the energy sources and all the sta-
tionary and mobile infrastructure present in that territory are located. The 
Defense White Paper (Brasil 2012c,  45) alludes to the possibility of conflicts 
arising from disputes involving the delimitation of sovereign rights over the 
maritime territorial extension of Brazil. In this regard, it points out that al-
though 152 countries have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, there are still non-adherent countries, including major powers, 
which in the future may become a source of disputes. The questioning of 
Brazilian property of the areas surrounding the pre-salt region could trigger a 
conflict (Oliveira; Cepik; Brites 2013,  4), which would certainly also jeopard-
ize all critical energy infrastructure.
The fourth threat would come from the actions of extra-regional pow-
ers seeking to preserve their interests in the South Atlantic zone. Regarding 
the international oil trade, “Due to its geographic and nautical characteristics, 
the South Atlantic basin allows the rapid transportation of large commercial 
volumes, particularly the ones that goes through the Cable Route where 66% 
of European oil and 26% of North American oil pass” (PENHA 2011, page 
222). This scenario is a threat to Brazilian energy security due to the zones of 
instability that can be created if the interests of these extra-regional powers in 
the South Atlantic are countered .
According to the NDS, the defense of the national critical energy in-
frastructure also requires the control of the maritime area, whose definition 
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is also established by the Brazilian Navy in the following terms: “Control that 
aims to guarantee some degree of utilization, even if temporary, of limited, 
stationary or mobile maritime areas, exercised in the intensity appropriate to 
the execution of specific activities “(Brazil 2007, 68). The primary intention 
of maritime area control is to ensure that the region is continuously moni-
tored so as to maintain the necessary conditions for its proper use according 
to the national interests. Under such circumstances, Brazilian naval power is 
employed in ordinary or extraordinary actions involving the daily surveillance 
of the national maritime space. If necessary, the effective response in case of 
real or notable danger will be carried out from the denial of the use of the sea, 
as previously demonstrated.
Regarding the defense of the national energy infrastructure, the con-
trol of the maritime area is of great relevance, especially in times of peace, 
and would, for example, ensure, through the monitoring of routes, the coor-
dinated and uninterrupted flow of international energy resources trade for 
the country. On the other hand, surveillance would also focus on constant at-
tention to the natural, stationary and mobile resources that are found in Bra-
zilian jurisdictional waters in the South Atlantic, whether or not they belong 
to the country, thus ensuring that national production of oil and natural gas 
develops regularly in the region. In addition, constant patrols and monitoring 
would also play a significant role in preventing and restraining environmental 
damage from problems on oceanic platform of fossil fuel extraction, or from 
watercraft carrying such resources, facilitating a faster and more effective re-
sponse.
A key factor in this task is the development of the Brazilian Surveil-
lance System (SISBRAV), which will integrate all the country’s monitoring 
and control systems, including the Blue Amazon Management System (SIS-
GAAz). The latter will function as a monitoring and control system for mar-
itime security and for the protection of the Brazilian coast. The intention is 
to make SISGAAz the Navy’s main command and control system, aimed at 
managing activities related to the sea that involve surveillance, monitoring, 
prevention of pollution, natural resources, among others. Besides, it aims to 
increase knowledge about the maritime environment and the positioning of 
naval operations to respond promptly to crises or emergencies occurring on 
the Brazilian coast (Brasil 2012c, 71-72).
The Brazilian Armed Forces are constantly carrying out training, sys-
tem alignment, testing and tactical procedures exercises for the defense of 
jurisdictional waters and the national coastal zone, which include the pro-
tection of energy resources, related infrastructure and routes where most of 
these goods circulate in the country. In this sense, we can mention Operation 
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Atlântico, which consists of one of the main joint interventions of the Armed 
Forces in the Brazilian coastal and oceanic area, whose third version (held in 
November 2012) was attended by approximately 10,000 military personnel. 
According to information from the Ministry of Defense, integrated actions in-
cluded exercises to protect national critical energy infrastructure, both in deep 
waters and in coastal regions, with one of its focuses being ports, refineries 
and hydroelectric and nuclear power plants8.
The second edition of Operation Blue Amazon, was held in March 
2015, under the coordination of the Naval Operations Command of the Bra-
zilian Navy, which deployed the largest number of troops and means used 
simultaneously in Brazilian waters, and had as objectives the intensification 
of the enforcement of laws and regulations and the repression of illicit acts of 
all types. During Operation Blue Amazon, the Brazilian Navy carried out, in 
addition to other activities, exercises to defend ports, oil and water terminals, 
and, with the support of Petrobras and Transpetro, conducted exercises in the 
Campos Basin, focused on the security of oil platforms and of ships moving 
in the region9.
Finally, the protection of the national critical energy infrastructure 
by the Brazilian Navy involves the projection of power, which refers to the 
“Strategy that is developed through cross-border military participation, in sit-
uations that allow international respect for the country, for own initiative or in 
response to requests from external agreements, in order to dissuade potential 
aggressors and to support national interests related to the maintenance of 
international peace” (Brasil 2007, 99). The objective of this strategy is related 
to the expansion of Brazil’s maritime military capacity, so that it is able to 
contribute to the formation of national interests not only in its territory but 
also in external areas or “targets”, precisely through imposition of force or the 
threat of its employment. In this sense, the National Defense Strategy states 
literally that “projection of power in the areas of strategic interest” is one of 
the “desired capabilities for the Armed Forces” of Brazil (Brasil 2008).
In the context of energy security - including the defense of the national 
energy infrastructure - the importance of the projection of power emerges at the 
moment when the Brazilian government conceives the need to act through 
8  Information from the website of the Ministry of Defense of Brazil. Available at: <http://
www.operacoes.defesa.mil.br/web/guest/atlantico-3?p_p_auth=LMPxlyD6&p_p_id=56&p_p_
lifecycle=0&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-3&p_p_col_
count=1&_56_groupId=10138&_56_articleId=53544#.U5a5M_ldVps>. Accessed: 12 December 
2015.
9  Information from the website of the Brazilian Navy. Available at: <https://www.mar.mil.
br/9dn/noticias2015_mar_resultados_amazonia_azul.html>. Accessed: 22 April 2016.
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the expression of military capacity before the actors (state or non-state actors) 
who operate in the international order, exercising it through effective postures 
and measures, which can generate conditions of cooperation or conflict in dif-
ferent contexts. Brazilian military actions in this regard may be necessary in 
the scenario of interdependence and competition that characterize world en-
ergy trade, with the aim of preserving national interests in its own territory, or 
with countries which either supply or consume energy resources. Brazil’s ob-
jective in such circumstances may range from stimulating or strengthening 
national prestige to limiting the power of influence of other nations. However, 
it is important to emphasize that the National Defense Strategy is particularly 
emphatic in pointing out that in this international insertion, “Brazil will rise 
to the forefront of the world without exerting hegemony or domination” (Bra-
sil 2008, 01).
According to this prediction, Brazil should have the military capacity 
to warn or ward off any threat in certain circumstances. Regarding this debate, 
former Minister of Defense Celso Amorim (2013) highlighted the importance 
of the Submarine Development Program (Prosub), created in 2009, which 
provides Brazil with the possibility of constructing submarines, including of 
nuclear propulsion, which leads the country to another level in international 
relations. However, all this has a cost, which consequently increases the coun-
try’s international visibility and imposes greater challenges for the govern-
ment and Brazilian society. The projection of power would not properly be an 
absurd, but something even desirable, but one has to realize that it is “[...] one 
of the most complex and expensive tasks for a Navy, since it implies not only 
a Marine Corps In permanent readiness [...], but large ships and some sort of 
airdrome ship” (Bertonha 2009, 25).
Facing some uncertainties, it is not absurd to say that the Brazilian 
leading role in energy, or any other reason, can lead to antagonisms in times 
to come, which is not to say that the country should transform into any form 
of a war machine, but rather that it should be prepared to protect its nation-
al interests in the South Atlantic region. The demand for energy resources 
in this area, for example, can overcome the economic dispute, becoming a 
“game” that may involve the projection of military power, so as to gain privi-
leged positions in the energy supply markets among countries in the region. 
From this point of view, considering both the protection of Brazil’s critical 
energy infrastructure and national security as a whole, the South Atlantic “[...] 
should be regarded as an important means of projecting power, of defense 
and security of territories of the countries located on both its sides, requiring 
an active presence of these countries capable of enforcing their rights and 
interests” (Fiore, Padula, Vater 2012, 133-134).
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By establishing effective actions for the advancement of hostile forc-
es, denial of the use of the sea, maritime area control and power projection are 
therefore of fundamental importance for active and concrete Brazilian energy 
security, as it improves the protection network of the complex national energy 
chain in the South Atlantic (including platforms, drill rigs and production, 
storage and transfer floating systems) and energy infrastructure located in the 
coastal zone (transfer/storage port terminals, oil and gas pipelines, refineries, 
etc.).
Final thoughts
The issues that were dealt with in the present study regarding the 
critical and strategically valuable energy infrastructure for Brazil allow us to 
reach some conclusions. These conclusions deserve to be highlighted and 
presented clearly, so that specific scenarios and challenges could be taken 
into comprehensive awareness by the government, society and other national 
actors seeking to establish strategies for the sustainable development of the 
country over the years.
One of the conclusions to be highlighted, initially, is that the protec-
tion of energy infrastructure of strategic value for Brazil is related to discus-
sions on national security and defense. According to the analysis carried out, 
the protection of Brazilian energy infrastructure is conceived as a security 
issue insofar as it is identified as a determining factor for the preservation 
of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, for the promotion of national 
interests, free of pressures and threats, as well as an element that guarantees 
Brazilian citizens the exercise of their constitutional rights and duties. On the 
other hand, it is a question of national defense because the security of such 
complexes requires, among other initiatives, a set of State measures and ac-
tions, with emphasis on military expression, against preponderantly external, 
potential or manifest threats, which are also intended to guarantee the protec-
tion of the territory, sovereignty and national interests. This perception about 
the framework of the protection of critical energy infrastructure in Brazil as 
a matter of security and national defense also derives from and is in perfect 
harmony with the definition given to the referred themes in the NDP (Brasil 
2005).
The second conclusion to be highlighted is that the analysis per-
formed throughout this paper showed that the South Atlantic and the Bra-
zilian coastal region are particularly important areas for Brazilian energy se-
curity, not only because the main oil and natural gas reserves are located in 
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these spaces but also, and not least, because most of the critical infrastructure 
related to the production, commercialization and consumption of such re-
sources in the country is located there. Brazilian jurisdictional waters include 
complexes that are essential for the economic exploitation of hydrocarbons, 
such as fixed, self-propelled and multi-legged platforms, drillships and pro-
duction, storage and transfer floating systems, as well as oil and gas pipelines. 
In the coastal zone, we can highlight the industrial complexes of petroleum 
refining, production of derivatives and the centers of production and process-
ing of natural gas in Brazil, as well as several complexes of pipelines, ports 
and terminals for receiving, shipping and storage of various energy resources 
that supply many regions of the country.
The onslaught of any enemy agent from the South Atlantic may result 
in the loss of Brazilian control over the country’s main fossil energy produc-
ing region and the destruction of a significant part of the national energy 
infrastructure, thereby causing disruption of the supply of essential resources 
the country needs, whether to ensure its survival and development in general, 
or to maintain its “war machine”. In all these circumstances, one can perceive 
the risks to which the country’s energy interests may be exposed if due atten-
tion is not paid to the role that the armed forces should play in the oceanic 
region under Brazilian domain and in Brazilian strategic contours.
The third conclusion that has been reached refers to the evaluation of 
the insertion of the protection of energy infrastructure of strategic value for 
Brazil in the main documents that guide national defense policy, specifically 
in the National Defense Policy (2005) and in the National Defense Strategy 
(2008). Summing up, it can be argued that such documents objectively re-
cord concern about the possibility of international conflicts over scarce re-
sources, including energy, and other external threats that may affect national 
energy security. Faced by this, they emphasize the need to defend, through 
the armed forces, trade routes, national energy sources and infrastructures, 
against threats that can directly affect domestic supply. A general analysis 
allows asserting above all that the defense policy in force in Brazil includes 
as one of its objectives to meet the imperative of maintaining the continuous 
supply of energy in the country, considering it as a priority issue.
More specifically, it can be said that the NDP makes no direct refer-
ence to the protection of the country’s critical energy infrastructure, which 
does not mean that it ignores the issue. The military defense of such com-
plexes would be guaranteed by the PDN to the extent that the use of offensive 
and defensive national military power focuses on the protection of strategic 
resources and the domain of vital spaces where they are, including, specifi-
cally, the coastal regions and the Brazilian jurisdictional waters. On the other 
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hand, the NDS is emphatic about the need to protect energy infrastructure of 
significant strategic value for Brazil, with direct guidelines on the proactive 
defense of oil platforms, naval and port facilities, as well as the safeguarding 
of the energy generation productive complex in general, including those locat-
ed in the South Atlantic area.
Finally, the fourth conclusion from this analysis identified that the 
Brazilian Navy has the primary role of protecting, controlling and monitor-
ing the national energy infrastructure complex that is located in the Brazilian 
maritime territorial extension in the South Atlantic. The actions, in this sense, 
include the denial of the use of the sea, the control of maritime areas and the 
projection of power. It is also worth mentioning that Brazil’s position on the 
military dimension of national energy security is that of a security provider, 
not admitting the possibility of delegating such mission to other countries, 
nor does it pretend to be a mere spectator in the strategic-military situation 
in the region.
Last but not least, one aspect that should be emphasized, still within 
the scope of the fourth conclusion, is that the military actions for the main-
tenance of Brazilian energy supply have an impact on other issues of the na-
tional interest, such as: the promotion of foreign policy (cooperation in the 
area of defense with bordering countries), environmental protection (contain-
ment of damage due to oil platforms problems), maritime commercial devel-
opment (protection of ports and maritime routes), generation of technology, 
employment and income (driven by the Brazilian defense industry).
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ABSTRACT
The study developed in this paper aims to analyze how the protection of Brazil’s critical 
energy infrastructure is dealt with under the national defense policy in order to better 
understand how the military dimension of energy security is outlined in Brazil. With 
the intention of achieving this goal, it seeks, initially, to identify which are and where 
are located the main Brazilian critical energy infrastructure relating to the oil chain, 
petroleum products and natural gas. Next, it aims to examine the extent to which the 
protection of such structural complexes is provided for in the national defense policy, 
particularly in the main documents dealing with the subject in the country. Finally, it 
observes how is the planning of the Brazilian offensive and defensive military power 
in the prevention and response to threats against the infrastructure related to the 
above-mentioned sources.
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